Beyond the Master Plan
The Case for Restructuring Baccalaureate Education in California

By Saul Geiser and Richard C. Atkinson

The 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education promised Californians the opportunity to pursue an education as far as their ability and ambition could take them. Half a century later, the promise remains unfulfilled. In fact, California ranks near the bottom of the states in the proportion of its college-age population who earn 4-year baccalaureate degrees.

The reasons for that failure are not well understood. Recent budget cuts have strained our colleges and universities to the limit, but California’s low rate of B.A. attainment is a longstanding problem that dates back well before the current fiscal crisis. Though a reliable revenue stream is sorely needed, money alone cannot solve the problem without fundamental changes in our system of higher education.

The Master Plan provided the blueprint for the system, and in many ways the blueprint has worked well. It enforced a strict differentiation of mission between the University of California, the state colleges (later the California State University), and the junior (later community) colleges, encouraging each to pursue excellence in its own sphere and preventing the costly competition for resources often seen in other states.

A Fateful Compromise

Yet for the one mission that all three segments share — baccalaureate education — the blueprint has been far less successful and in fact poses a major obstacle to B.A. completion. The problem stems from a political compromise made by those who originally framed the Master Plan. Before 1960, enrollment in California higher education was about equally divided between 4-year and 2-year campuses. In order to win legislative approval for the Plan, however, the framers agreed to limit eligibility for admission to the University of California and the state colleges to the top eighth (12.5%) and top third (33.3%), respectively, of the state’s high school graduates. There was no educational rationale for these particular percentages except to cut costs in the short term. In the first year alone, the Master Plan diverted approximately 50,000 students from 4-year to 2-year campuses. The framers envisioned that those who were not initially eligible for UC or the state colleges could complete their lower-division work at a junior college and then transfer to a 4-year campus.

Five decades later, the impact of the Master Plan’s restrictions on access to 4-year campuses is readily apparent. Two-year colleges have absorbed the vast majority of enrollment growth in California higher education since 1960, but 4-year enrollments have not kept pace.

California now enrolls a lower proportion of its college students at 4-year campuses than any other state. Even large, demographically comparable states, ...
like New York and Florida, enroll the majority of their students at 4-year campuses. In California, the proportion is just 26 percent. The Master Plan’s caps on 4-year enrollment appear especially restrictive when viewed in relation to the size of California’s college-age population: Only about 8 percent of our 18-to-29 year old population is enrolled at the 4-year level, placing California next to the last in the nation on this measure. We rank ahead of only Mississippi in the percentage of seniors who move directly from high school to a 4-year institution.

**Importance of 4-Year Capacity**

Comparison of higher education systems in other states shows that 4-year capacity — the size of a state’s 4-year sector relative to its college-age population — is the single most important determinant of B.A. productivity. Even after controlling for other differences such as per capita spending on higher education, states with the largest proportion of college enrollments at the 4-year level have the highest rates of B.A. attainment.

Given California’s low 4-year capacity, our low rate of B.A. productivity should come as no surprise. We rank just 43rd in the nation in the proportion of our college-age population who earn B.A.s.

California’s low rate of B.A. productivity is sometimes blamed on the failure of the community colleges to produce more transfers, but the problem is more fundamental: California’s caps on 4-year enrollment have restricted not only freshman admissions but transfer admissions as well.

Although the Master Plan requires both UC and CSU to maintain a 60%/40% ratio of upper- to lower-division enrollments in order to leave room for junior transfers from the community colleges, those percentages also include many continuing students, so that the space available for first-time students — whether freshmen or transfers — is relatively limited. At UC, freshmen traditionally have accounted for about 70% of all first-time students in order to meet its Master Plan target for freshman eligibility; at CSU, the figure is now about 60%, with transfers making up the balance. To increase transfer admissions, however, would require that freshman admissions be reduced in inverse proportion. This is the reason why it has proven so difficult historically to boost transfer rates, and why current efforts to guarantee transfer to UC and CSU are unlikely to prove scalable in the absence of additional capacity at the 4-year level. California’s 4-year sector is simply too small in relation to the size of its college-age population.

**Building New Capacity?**

The state urgently needs to expand 4-year capacity if we are to expand B.A. attainment among the generation of Californians now reaching college age. Yet building expensive new university campuses is an unlikely option given the state’s fiscal circumstances. As an alternative, some have proposed authorizing community colleges to award the B.A.

The “community college baccalaureate” would add upper-division programs at 2-year campuses, possibly enabling students to complete a B.A. without having to leave their local community college. As Florida and other states that have experimented with this model have found, however, such programs are expensive. To offer the B.A., community colleges must meet accreditation requirements, which may require them to create new undergraduate majors, upgrade facilities and laboratories, expand library holdings, and increase the number of faculty with Ph.D.s to teach the proposed programs. In California’s present fiscal environment, building new institutional capacity at either the community college or university level would be prohibitively expensive. Restructuring our postsecondary system to make better use of existing capacity makes more sense.

**Models of Structural Reform**

The past two decades have seen a flurry of structural reforms in other state higher education systems that California would do well to consider. A common denominator in these reforms is the creation of new, hybrid models that link state universities and community colleges and take better advantage of existing institutional capacity at both levels. Examples include university centers and 2-year university branch campuses:
University centers: Under this model, community colleges and universities collaborate to offer upper-division coursework at 2-year campuses, enabling students to complete all or most of their 4-year degree program there. Unlike the community college baccalaureate, however, the senior institution actually awards the degree. Accreditation is not an issue, since the model makes use of existing B.A. programs, and the cost is less than creating new B.A. programs from scratch. Although not a new idea, the university center model has gained new momentum in recent years and is now employed in about 20 other states. It is sometimes referred to as the “joint use” or “co-location” model insofar as 2-year and 4-year institutions jointly deliver instruction at the same physical location, most often the 2-year campus. But the model is also readily adaptable to a distance-learning approach, whereby 4-year institutions deliver upper-division programs to community college students online rather than onsite, an approach that has been pioneered in Ohio.

2-year university branches: At least 18 states have established 2-year university branches as part of their higher education systems. Under this model, some (though not all) 2-year campuses operate as lower-division satellites of state universities. The model has two key advantages. First, it expands 4-year enrollment capacity, enabling more students to enter 4-year baccalaureate programs directly from high school. Second, it eliminates the need for a separate transfer-Admissions process, so that student progress to the B.A. is more seamless. In 2005, for example, Penn State consolidated 14 branch campuses located throughout the state under one organizational umbrella, enabling students to pursue lower-division programs in over 160 baccalaureate majors. They then transition to the main campus at University Park to complete their major, a process known as “change of assignment” since transfer, in the traditional sense, is eliminated.

By making better use of existing institutional capacity, such hybrid models have the potential to improve baccalaureate attainment without substantially increasing costs. For example, were California to convert some of its community colleges into UC and CSU branch campuses, the marginal cost of instruction formula under which community colleges are currently funded would likely be sufficient to cover most if not all core instructional costs; the net cost of subsidizing a community college student is roughly comparable to a lower-division student at UC and CSU. Costs can also be contained by judicious use of information technology. Hybrid models that link 2-year with 4-year campuses are well suited not only for distance learning but also electronic access to library facilities at the senior campus as well as administrative services such as admissions, registration, and financial aid.

50 years ago the Master Plan signaled a new social contract between California and its public colleges and universities: In return for a stable base of state support, they would extend opportunity to all with the ambition and ability to succeed in college. Neither party has lived up to their social contract with Californians, our colleges and universities need to take the first step by creating a more coherent blueprint for baccalaureate education.

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The Evolution of Blood Clotting

By Russ Doolittle
Professor Emeritus of Chemistry & Biochemistry and Molecular Biology

Long time readers of Chronicles may recall that several years ago the editor invited me to comment on the never-ending dispute between Evolutionists and proponents of Intelligent Design. Particularly, Richard Dawkins had just published a brutal review in the New York Times Times of a new book by Michael Behe, a champion of Intelligent Design. In an earlier book, the best seller Darwin’s Black Box, Behe had attempted to show that most life processes are simply too complex to have evolved by natural selection. In fact, he had devoted one of his chapters to ridiculing my work on the evolution of blood clotting. Blood clotting, he contended, is irreducibly complex and could not be the result of chance and Darwinian selection.

My own view had been that blood clotting is indeed complex, but hardly irreducibly so, and I had long ago set out to unravel its evolutionary history. Briefly put, in vertebrate animals, the central event in blood clotting is the conversion of a soluble protein called fibrinogen into an insoluble one called fibrin, the reaction being catalyzed by an enzyme called thrombin. Fibrin is a gelatinous polymer that is by nature squishy enough to seal up wounds so that the circulating blood doesn’t leak out. Numerous other protein factors interact to encourage fibrin formation, but there are almost as many that inhibit the process. It is a delicate balance.

The evolutionary scenario I envisioned involved a succession of gene duplications, resting on the well-established principle of “duplicate and modify,” all quite consistent with Darwinian natural selection.

The reason Behe singled me out for his straw-man was that he had happened upon a 1993 article of mine in which I proposed a step-by-step evolutionary progression in which, for every new agent favoring clot formation that might evolve, there would subsequently be a counter-agent tipping the balance back toward liquidity. The back and forth progression would continue, each advance leading to more finely-tuned regulation. In the way of a metaphor, I described the process as a kind of “Yin and Yang.” It was this feature with which Behe had a field day lampooning my article, describing it as a “Calvin and Hobbes just so story.”

Now I have written my own book on the subject (The Evolution of Vertebrate Blood Clotting, University Science Books, 2012), and once again the Chronicles editor has invited me to comment. My aim in writing the book was to provide a model of how evolution works in general by examining blood clotting in particular. Fortunately, the new era of genome biology has made it possible to trace the development of protein networks by identifying their genes. In this regard, the complete DNA sequences of a wide variety of animals are now in hand, and one can use computers to search through them to find where, in a phylogenetic sense, particular genes first appeared. Indeed, reconstruction of events by this approach largely confirms the course predicted in the Yin and Yang article lampooned by Behe. For example, in lampreys, one of the most primitive (early diverging) vertebrates extant, only about half of the genes are found that encode blood clotting factors in humans.

Like Behe, I set out to write for a general audience, thinking I might be able to de-bamboozle some of those whom he had taken in with his best seller. But it was not to be. Pre-publication reviewers thought the book much too technical for a general audience: too many facts, not enough anecdotes.

What to do? In the end, I chose the easier way out and wrote a simple, objective monograph on the subject with no mention of Intelligent Design or Creationists. No best-seller here; instead, a straightforward account that I hope illustrates the way molecular evolution works.

The book turned out to be more than a simple inventory of genes for clotting factors in various species. During the course of my writing, all sorts of thoughts arose about experiments that could be performed to strengthen my arguments. As a case in point, while I was trawling through the genome of the common sea squirt, a creature belonging to a group that pre-dates vertebrates and whose simple circulating fluid does not clot, I unexpectedly found a set of genes that were closely related to those that encode fibrinogen in vertebrates. For me it was like an anthropologist stumbling across a complete skeleton of some ancient anthropoid ancestor. The putative protein was a veritable Lucy of molecular antiquity.

Close inspection revealed that the sea squirt protein lacked a small but key feature of vertebrate fibrinogen, leaving it one step away from being a protein that might be transformed into fibrin. In these days of genetic engineering, it ought not be difficult to splice that small missing feature into sea squirt DNA and express the modified protein in the laboratory. One could then add a small amount of thrombin to see if the sea squirt protein would be converted into a fibrin clot. If it were, it would be a dramatic demonstration of resurrecting an ancient evolutionary event: the transition of a non-clottable protein into a clottable one.

I feel confident the engineered protein will form a clot, and I would truly love to do the experiment. Realistically, I am hoping that some young molecular biologist with the appropriate resources will do it, and quickly, while I’m around to hear the answer.

UCSD Emeriti Association
Leading from Behind: The “Obama Doctrine” and the Middle East

By Sanford Lakoff

The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and ratify treaties but in the modern era, American presidents are expected to set the national agenda in foreign policy. Some presidents have announced their policies by promulgating strategic “doctrines.” Barack Obama has yet to follow their example: but something that could pass for an “Obama Doctrine” is now emerging. It entails a distinctly lowered posture for the U.S. in world affairs, except when national security is directly threatened, in contrast to the neo-conservative view of this country as the global champion of freedom that emboldened the previous administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead of trying to impose a Pax Americana, this administration is content to “lead from behind,” as in the case of Libya.

The means with which this unstated doctrine are being implemented are twofold: either “strategic partnerships,” or “coercive diplomacy.” The partnerships entail assistance, joint military exercises, and intelligence sharing. Coercive diplomacy takes the form of economic sanctions coupled with offers to negotiate. When such measures prove inadequate, or when humanitarian intervention is supported by international consensus, direct military intervention will be limited mainly to the use of missiles and air warfare. Direct combat missions will be undertaken against terrorists, but by unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and special forces.

To be sure, Obama may discover that the best-laid plans of a global superpower are sometimes upset by the need to respond to unanticipated crises, or that “mission creep” is hard to avoid once even limited force is committed. But at least the new design is moving from the background of the first term to the foreground of the second.

When he was first elected, Obama named Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, even though she had voted as a senator to authorize the use of force in Iraq that he had opposed. He retained Robert Gates, a holdover from the previous administration, as Secretary of Defense. General David Petraeus, the architect of President George W. Bush’s surge policy, was kept on in Iraq and then sent to Afghanistan before being named director of the CIA. Now, Clinton has been replaced by John Kerry; Chuck Hagel heads the Pentagon; and John Brennan directs the CIA. Kerry and Hagel are well known for agreeing with Obama that military engagement should be avoided if at all possible. Brennan has championed the “light footprint” military strategy. Samantha Power at the U.N. and Susan Rice as national security adviser are on the same wavelength. These appointments show, as the New York Times reported, that Obama has sided with Vice President Joe Biden’s view “that caution, covert action and a modest American military footprint around the world fit the geopolitical moment.”

This change of policy arises more out of the difference in circumstances between the first term and the second than out of an evolution in Obama’s thinking. Early on, he gave voice to views now evident in his appointments, but proceeded much more cautiously in foreign policy than on the domestic front. In the primary Hillary Clinton had warned that in foreign policy he would have to learn on the job, and the first term was rife with chastening experience. Instead of redirecting American foreign policy, Obama usually found himself sustaining inherited commitments. A major reason Obama opted for continuity in foreign policy is that he was compelled to devote most of his attention to a domestic crisis. Confronted by a serious recession, he had to stabilize the financial sector. Unwilling to sacrifice his reform agenda, he pressed to obtain passage of the Affordable Care Act, and paid a high price as it dragged out in Congress and the voters blamed him for failing to reverse the recession by electing a Republican-led House in 2010. He had to deal with two wars, one of which, in Iraq, he had opposed, and the other, in Afghanistan, he had approved of as a “war of choice” but which had become a war for control of the country rather than only against al Qaeda.

At the same time, he sought to define a new approach reflecting his own liberal outlook, emphasizing conciliation rather than confrontation. It was as if in foreign policy he was recapitulating his role as a community organizer in Chicago, now on a world stage. He and Secretary Clinton sought to “reset” relations with Russia. He made friendly overtures to China. He launched an effort to address the problem of nuclear proliferation by North Korea by enlisting Chinese cooperation, but when he found that Beijing would not risk causing the collapse of the Pyongyang regime by withholding aid critical to its survival, he chose not to threaten unilateral action but instead opted for “strategic patience.”

Continuity was evident as well in his approach to the problem of terrorism, except for his order that no further reference be made to the “war on terror.” Obama continued the emphasis on Homeland Security and on attacking the leadership of al Qaeda, authorizing an intensive and ultimately successful effort to find and eliminate bin Laden. But the use of special forces and of drones for surveillance and targeted assassination had been begun earlier and was only accelerated by Obama.

In the Middle East, the main focus of Obama’s first term was on the unfinished business of Iraq. Once the surge seemed to succeed in blunting threats to the survival of the elected government, he

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pressed for disengagement. Caution was also the watchword when the Arab Spring broke out. When the demand for change spread to Bahrein, where the U.S. Fifth Fleet is anchored, the administration ignored calls for intervention.

But the politics of hope suffered one rebuff after another. Even the rebellious youth of the Arab Spring found fault with Washington for supporting the tyrants they were overthrowing. None of the efforts to improve America’s image bore fruit. Most Muslims were less favorable toward the U.S. in the closing months of Obama’s first term than they had been when he took office. The Russians remained unwilling to cooperate on Iran and Syria. The North Koreans defied the U.S. The Chinese government, pandering to nationalist sentiment, has sought to extend Chinese control of disputed adjacent areas and has begun efforts to develop power projection capabilities, provoking countermoves by the United States.

Obama made two striking departures from continuity. Late in his first term, he decided to intervene in Libya, but in such a way as to preclude sending in ground troops and in cooperation with NATO allies and friendly Arab states. At the time, this initiative seemed as though it might be a harbinger of a new policy or a reinstatement of Bill Clinton’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia to stop “ethnic cleansing.” The other notable innovation was the decision to declare that Iran would not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. This decision is in keeping with what may be emerging as the Obama Doctrine because at the same time that it threatens military action as a last resort – presumably in the form of surgical strikes at Iran’s nuclear installations – it does not require invasion or regime change and “nation-building.”

Much to the consternation of those who have called for intervention in Syria as a way of helping to bring down a brutal dictatorship and at the same time weaken Iran, Libya did not prove a precedent for Syria. The initial rationale given by the administration for the decision not to engage in Syria on the same humanitarian grounds was that this time there was no Security Council authorization and conditions were more challenging. The opposition was fragmented and included large numbers of al Qaeda volunteers and Islamists. The Syrian military was a formidable force and Syria’s air defenses would complicate any effort to impose no-fly zones. And what would happen once the regime fell? Would an anti-Western Islamist regime come to power? Would the country fall apart into sectarian and ethnic enclaves? Would there be a bloodbath against the Alawites that would compel an occupation?

In view of these inhibiting factors, Obama opted to provide humanitarian aid and encourage the formation of a unified opposition, but not take any action to stop the slaughter. In response to reports that the regime was readying chemical weapons, the U.S. warned Bashar Assad that any resort to chemical weapons would trigger intervention. But when Secretary Clinton and General Petraeus proposed a plan for supplying arms to friendly rebels, it was rejected. The lesson seems to be that Libya was a kind of black swan – an unusual instance case where humanitarian intervention could be accomplished by airpower in a multilateral effort with U.N. backing in which the U.S. could “lead from behind” and not become inextricably entangled.

The administration’s most immediate concerns overseas involve accelerating the drawdown of troops from Afghanistan and pursuing a carrot-and-stick approach toward Iran. Longer term, the issue for the executive and Congress is how to cut the military budget to help address the national debt. Given the administration’s stated objectives, the key personnel appointments, and the budgetary pressures, it seems predictable that Obama’s second term will better express his original intention to reframe America’s role in the world from neo-Wilsonian champion of liberty and democracy to “superpower-of-last-resort.”

What the putative Obama Doctrine means for the Middle East (and by extension for Afghanistan and Pakistan) is that people in regions where instability is the rule will have to fend for themselves unless that instability poses a direct threat to the U.S. Terrorists who do not target this country will be monitored but not engaged. If Afghanistan’s central government falters as NATO forces are withdrawn, the U.S. will not return in force unless uncontrolled areas become sanctuaries for al Qaeda. Military aid will be provided to Pakistan even if it does not act aggressively against its own Taliban. The U.S. would intervene directly only if Pakistan was threatened with loss of control of its nuclear weapons. Kerry has brokered a resumption of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians but if no progress is made, the administration will likely seek to preserve the status quo. If Iraq breaks apart, Obama is hardly likely to want to return American forces to restore unity. If Syria disintegrates into a weakened state with sectarian enclaves like Lebanon, the Marines will not ride to the rescue, unless there is a risk that its chemical weapons could fall into the wrong hands. In Yemen, the U.S. will rely on drone attacks against al Qaeda forces but will not try to reestablish the central government. Where, as in Mali this year, American allies are willing to send in troops to fight against terrorists, the U.S. will provide transport planes and either donate or sell war materiel. The military coup in Egypt, and the subsequent suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, has been met with harsh criticism from the White House, but the administration has been loath to cut off aid. If Libya or Tunisia falter in making a transition from authoritarianism to incipient democracy, the U.S. will very unlikely remain a concerned spectator but resist calls to intervene. Nor will Washington withdraw support from the cooperative authoritarian regimes threatened by the spread of the “Arab Spring,” lest they be replaced by anti-American governments or anarchic conditions that can allow terrorists to find new havens.

The largest unknown concerns Iran. In March of 2012 Obama stated flatly that the U.S. would not permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon and that as president he would be prepared to use force as a last
resort: "As I’ve made clear time and time again during the course of my presidency, I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend the United States and its interests." But leading members of the military and foreign policy establishment have expressed grave reservations about any use of American military force against Iran. It remains to be seen whether and how a strategy of “leading from behind” can succeed against an adversary capable of resisting non-military pressures and whether, if all other means fail, Obama will carry out his pledge. If Iran can be persuaded to step back from the nuclear bomb threshold and accept unimpeded inspections, Obama will gain considerable political capital among both Arabs and Israelis, which he could conceivably use to promote pacification and reform throughout the region.

With the potential exception of Iran, however, the “Obama Doctrine” calls for America to focus on nation-building at home rather than adventures abroad, the Middle East included. If democracy is to gain ground in the region, it will have to be the work of the people there themselves.

Adapted from a longer article by the same title available on line in Strategic Assessment (Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University), April 2013.

JOIN THE EMERITI MENTORING PROGRAM!

September marks the end of summer and the start of a new academic year. It also brings both a continuation and a new class of undergraduate Chancellor’s Scholars for the UCSD Emeriti Mentoring Program (EMP). Through the efforts of our mentors, led by Mel Green and past EMP faculty chairs, and especially the work of Suzan Cioffi and staff, our EMP has gained local and national recognition for its success in helping talented undergraduates relatively unprepared for higher education to acquire the “survival skills” to do well at UCSD and beyond.

As a testimony to the value of this program, Chancellor Pradeep Khosla has requested that we also mentor the newly created Chancellor’s Associates Scholars. These first-generation college students will constitute the charter class from three San Diego high schools: Preuss, Gompers, and Lincoln. The EMP has accepted this challenge and this fall both groups will be matched with volunteer faculty for their freshman and sophomore years. Suzan and staff from both the Retirement Resource Center and several campus offices have been meeting and working out logistics, funding, and plans for this first year of the two programs.

Beginning in October we will also continue the tradition of informal EMP lunch meetings in the Faculty Club the first Monday of every month, starting at 12 noon, to meet and discuss mentoring issues and new ideas. You are cordially invited to attend, whether you eat lunch or just share your ideas. This year we also are planning one campus-sponsored lunch for mentors per quarter with a guest speaker. The dates, speakers, and locations for these new sessions will be announced when details are finalized.

The success of our mentoring program depends on the dedicated contributions of emeriti faculty from all disciplines. We congratulate those who have already taken part in the program and invite you to join it. In order to match new students with mentors we need to list more available mentors so please contact Morton Printz (mpprintz@ucsd.edu), Chairman of the EMP, or Suzan Cioffi (scioffi@ucsd.edu) to offer your services. We know you too will find it truly rewarding.

❖ Morton Printz, Professor Emeritus of Pharmacology

ANECDOTAGE

By Sandy Lakoff

In July Ellen Turkish Comisso, Professor of Political Science, died — too young — of natural causes while hiking near the San Dieguito River in North County. I was department chair when Ellen was first appointed and we had a memorable encounter early on.

She had done an excellent dissertation at Yale on experiments with workers’ control of industry in Yugoslavia so we were all enthusiastic about appointing her. But Ellen was a political radical and she posed a problem for me when she submitted a course proposal that I had to sign on to and send to the CEP. It was to deal with the American labor movement by examining its “proletarianization.” I told her I couldn’t approve the use of that term because it was politically loaded. She protested that I was interfering with her academic freedom and demanded a department meeting.

I brought to the meeting a stack of books on American labor history not one of which used the term. David Laitin — who now works on what Berkeley people call “the farm” in Palo Alto — produced a Wall Street Journal editorial in which the word appeared. I replied that capitalist propagandists and Marxists needed each other to drum up business but we were social scientists. Someone proposed that Henry Ehrmann, a senior visiting faculty member from Dartmouth, be asked to mediate. I agreed (though I might not have had I known then, as I learned later, that in his youth Henry had written for a Swiss journal called “Rote Revue” — i.e., Red Review!).

Henry persuaded Ellen to amend the course description and I okayed it. (He must have told her that once she got the course approved she could teach it any way she wanted, and she may have decided, like other radicals of the time, that the best way to bring down the bourgeois establishment was to “bore from within.”)

The sequel came a few months later when Ellen went to Yugoslavia to do further research on what became her first book. In the department mail came a package for me enclosing a bright red banner with gold-col-

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orded Cyrillic lettering that translated as the famous exhortation with which Marx and Engels ended the Communist Manifesto: “Proletarians of all countries, unite!” America may not have had a proletariat but Ellen had class.

Annual British Dementia Test (Thanks to Paul Friedman)

It’s that time of year for us to take our annual senior citizen test. Exercise of the brain is as important as exercise of the muscles. As we grow older, it’s important to keep mentally alert. If you don’t use it, you lose it! Below is a very private way to gauge how your memory compares to the last test. Some may think it is too easy, but the ones with memory problems may have difficulty. Take the test presented here to determine if you’re losing it or not. The spaces below each question are so you don’t see the answers until you’ve made your answer. OK, relax, clear your mind and begin.

Question 1: What do you put in a toaster?

Answer: “Bread.” If you said “toast” give up now and do something else … Try not to hurt yourself. If you said “bread,” go to Question 2.

Question 2: Say “silk” five times. Now spell “silk.” What do cows drink?

Answer: Cows drink water. If you said “milk,” don’t attempt the next question. Your brain is overstressed and may even overheat. Content yourself with reading more appropriate literature such as Auto World. However, if you said “water,” proceed to question 3.

Question 3: If a red house is made from red bricks and a blue house is made from blue bricks and a pink house is made from pink bricks and a black house is made from black bricks, what is a green house made from?

Answer: Greenhouses are made from glass. If you said “green bricks,” why are you still reading these?? If you said “glass,” go on to Question 4.

Question 4: Without using a calculator — You are driving a bus from London to Milford Haven in Wales. In London, 17 people get on the bus. In Reading, 6 people get off the bus and 9 people get on. In Swindon, 2 people get off and 4 get on. In Cardiff, 11 people get off and 16 people get on. In Swansea, 3 people get off and 5 people get on. In Carmathen, 6 people get off and 3 get on. You then arrive at Milford Haven. Without scrolling back to review, how old is the bus driver?

Answer: Oh, for crying out loud! Don’t you remember your own age? It was YOU driving the bus!!

◆ Mark Your Calendar! ◆

Steven Schick
Professor of Music
“Why Music Matters”
Wednesday, Oct 9, 4:00-5:30

David Braff
Professor of Psychiatry
“The Enigma of Schizophrenia”
Wednesday, Nov 13, 4:00-5:30

Emily Roxworthy
Associate Professor of Theatre
“From Performance Studies to Digital Humanities: Adventures in Interdisciplinarity”
Wednesday, Feb 12, 4:00-5:30

 Chronicles

Newsletter of the UCSD Emeriti Association

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