

## Hocus Potus The Worst One Hundred Days?

**“No administration has ever been off to a worse 100-day start.”**

*Steve Schmidt, Republican strategist*

### Obamacare Survives, for Now

by **Richard G. Kronick**

*Professor of Family and Preventive Medicine/ Adjunct Professor of Political Science*

I worked in the **Obama** Administration for six years on implementing the Affordable Care Act, aka Obamacare. The most gratifying work I have done in a long professional career was to be a small part of the effort to bring health insurance to more than 20 million previously uninsured Americans. Along with many others, I celebrated on March 24 when House Speaker **Paul Ryan** was forced, by opposition within the Republican Party, to abandon the mean-spirited **Ryan/Trump** proposal to repeal and replace the ACA.

The failure, to date at least, of the **Ryan/Trump** proposal occurred in large part because of a “bait and switch” offer. On the campaign trail, candidate **Trump** promised a great plan in which everyone would have health insurance and costs would be lower. While he clearly could not deliver on that promise without completely dismantling employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) and moving to single payer, the product that was delivered was

even more harmful than it needed to be. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the **Ryan/Trump** proposal would have stripped coverage from 24 million Americans, increased premiums in the non-group market, and delivered enormous tax breaks to a small number of very wealthy Americans. A bait and switch of epic proportions.

The ACA has created substantial progress on access to care, and contributed to forward movement on both cost control and improvements in quality of care. On access, as a result of the ACA, more than 20 million Americans now have health insurance coverage who would not have had it in the absence of the ACA. Newly insured people have better access to care, are receiving more preventive services, and enjoy greater financial stability. Remarkably, this substantial expansion in access has been accompanied by a historic slowdown in cost growth. Over the forty years from 1970 to 2010, health care costs grew, on average, 2.5% per year more quickly than growth in the rest of the economy. From 2010 to 2015, health care costs grew 0.5% per year more

quickly than the rest of the economy. While this slowdown was not entirely the result of the ACA, the ACA contributed to the result, particularly through slowing the rate of growth of Medicare spending.

Our ability to comprehensively measure quality of care is much more limited than our ability to measure access or costs (which is a big part of the reason that it is so hard to fashion a health care system that is accountable), but most of the measures we have indicate improvements in quality post-ACA. Most notably, adverse

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#### ◆◆◆ Inside ◆◆◆

Obamacare Survives, for now...	1
Sanctuary Cities .....	3
Trump and Climate .....	4
Trump on Trade .....	6
Emeriti Book Club .....	6
Anecdoteage .....	7
Mark your calendar .....	8

events in hospitals declined by 21% from 2010 to 2015 – from 145 adverse events per thousand hospitalizations to 115/1,000 in 2015. We should be cautious in trumpeting this progress -- 115 adverse events per thousand hospitalizations is still way too much harm. Nevertheless, 3 million fewer patients were harmed as a result of this progress, and, more importantly, 124,000 fewer patients died, along with an estimated cost savings of \$28 billion. As with all improvements in safety, the reasons for the improvement are multifactorial, but it is clear that a variety of provisions in the ACA were instrumental in this progress.

That said, the ACA clearly did not solve the major problems that we face in creating an equitable and sensible health care financing system. Drafters of the ACA felt constrained to leave in place employer-sponsored insurance for 160 million Americans, forcing them to try to make the market for individual insurance somewhat less dysfunctional than it was prior to the ACA. They were partially successful, but only partially successful, in achieving that goal. The combination of substantial subsidies for the purchase of non-group insurance and requirements for guaranteed issue and community rating have improved the functioning of the non-group market in California and other states that are committed to its success and where the conditions for healthy competition among insurers have been more favorable. But in many states there was only one insurer in the non-group market prior to the ACA (typically a Blue Cross plan), and in some states the Blue Cross plan (or, as it is now known in many states, Anthem) is once again the only insurer, and that gives the insurer tremendous leverage over pricing.

Much ink has been spilled bemoaning the problem that not enough healthy young people have signed up for marketplace coverage, and that the risk pool is too sick. But there is virtually no evidence to support that

claim. Premiums in the individual market remain comparable to (or lower than) premiums for similar coverage for employer-sponsored insurance. If the ACA risk pool were really so sick, ACA premiums would be much higher than employer-sponsored premiums, and they are not. And this outcome makes sense – the ACA offers substantial subsidies to people with incomes below 400% of the Federal Poverty Level. It is these subsidies that keep both the healthy and the sick in the risk pool.

The analogy here to employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) is useful. In ESI, employers offer employees a choice of insurance products, and offer to pay, on average, about 75% of the cost of coverage. Virtually all employees, both the healthy and the sick, take the employer up on this offer. The analogy is far from perfect – for a variety of reasons, take-up of coverage in the non-group market is lower than that for ESI, and people with incomes above 400% of poverty do not receive subsidies. But the concerns about adverse selection in which only sick people will want to purchase insurance are overblown.

More importantly, the structure of the subsidies prevent the “death spiral” that has also been the subject of so much rhetorical wailing. In an unsubsidized environment, when premiums increase rapidly, there is good reason

*The fundamental, problem for the repeal and replacement effort is the lack of a coherent policy proposal for how to improve health care access, cost, or quality. This problem was made manifest in the devastating assessment of the Ryan/Trump proposal made by the Congressional Budget Office.*

to be concerned that relatively healthy people will stop purchasing coverage, leaving only the sick in the risk pool. But the ACA caps individual’s payments as a percent of their income. As a result, when premiums increase, there is no reason to be concerned, at least for people with incomes below 400% of FPL that the healthy will bail. Enrollment data from 2017 confirm

this intuition – despite substantial premium increases in some states, enrollment hardly changed at all.

The fact that the ACA has brought benefits to many, and the fact that the ACA is not a “disaster” or “imploding” contributed to the support that it has received. The successes of the ACA make it harder for the Republicans to agree about how to get rid of it. But those facts would not have been sufficient to prevent agreement in the absence of deep fissures within the GOP. In the House, the ACA was saved by the Freedom Caucus, which objected to the fact that the Ryan/Trump proposal did not go far enough in repealing the ACA. It is frightening that were it not for the extreme position of the Freedom Caucus, the House appeared ready to pass a bill that would have stripped coverage from 24 million Americans, led to increases in premiums for non-group insurance, and put health care for tens of millions additional low income Americans covered by Medicaid at risk. I am somewhat heartened by the knowledge that that bill would almost certainly have failed in the Senate, but success in the House would put pressure on the Senate to do something.

The fundamental, problem for the repeal and replacement effort is the lack of a coherent policy proposal for how to improve health care access, cost, or quality. This problem was made manifest in the devastating assessment of the Ryan/Trump proposal made by the Congressional Budget Office.

Despite the obstacles, Trump and the Republicans do not have the choice of giving up on their efforts. They have been outspoken on the importance of “repeal and replace,” and will be punished by some of their supporters for failure. There is already talk of “ZombieCare,” in which the White House continues to make efforts at finding a path forward. At some point, the Freedom Caucus may decide that “yes” is better than “failure,” although I remain hopeful that the few moderate Republicans in the Senate would be unwilling to end health care coverage for millions of constituents in order to provide tax breaks for a few.

## Sanctuary Cities Increase – Not Threaten – Public Safety

By Wayne A. Cornelius, Angela S. García, and Monica W. Varsanyi

President **Donald Trump**'s executive order seeking to halt federal funding to sanctuary cities contends that the main function of such jurisdictions is to protect "criminal aliens" from deportation, and warns ominously of a "public safety threat." The order would also have us believe that public safety would be enhanced if we expanded efforts to remove undocumented immigrants by enlisting local police in a mass deportation campaign.

In fact, quite the opposite is true. Sanctuary jurisdictions – 39 cities and 364 counties across the country have policies that limit local law enforcement's involvement in enforcing federal immigration laws – increase public safety.

Trump's executive order effectively revives two highly controversial programs that aimed to enlist state and local police and sheriffs in immigration enforcement: the 287(g) program and Secure Communities. The 287(g) program deputized local and state police and sheriffs to serve as immigration agents, and was phased out in the latter years of the Obama administration due to excessive costs and administrative inefficiency. Secure Communities required that people arrested and processed in county jails be screened for immigration violations, and it, too, was phased out during the Obama administration, as mounting evidence showed that the program encouraged racial profiling by local law enforcement. Reviving these two programs is essential to implementing Trump's deportation campaign, which must rely on local police as force-multipliers for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency.

In the minds of those responsible for maintaining law and order —

police chiefs and sheriffs — sanctuary cities are an important tool for maintaining public safety. In a recently published study, *Policing Immigrants: Local Law Enforcement on the Front Lines*, researchers interviewed over 750 police chiefs and sheriffs across the country. In red states and blue states alike, a majority of them were opposed to programs like 287(g) and expressed serious concerns about involving their officers in immigration enforcement. Three out of four said that immigration enforcement should remain a federal responsibility.

In particular, a majority of the interviewees placed a high priority on gaining the trust of immigrants. They reported that in places where local police had been involved in immigration enforcement, immigrants were far more reluctant to contact the police if they were victims of, or witnesses to, a crime. A majority also said that involving local law enforcement in immigration enforcement significantly erodes this critical trust.

Around 9 million people are members of "mixed-status" families that have both undocumented and legal-resident members. If interaction with police can result in arrest and deportation, this population as a whole will be reluctant to report crimes, make official statements, or testify in court. This undermines public safety for everyone, not just immigrants.

Supporting evidence comes from another, forthcoming study, *Legal Passing: Navigating Undocumented Life and Local Immigration Law*, for which over 100 undocumented immigrants in southern California were interviewed. In the region's 21 sanctuary cities and counties, undocumented residents were generally willing to interact with police. Their fears revolved around potential retaliation for reporting gang-related activity, not deportation. But in cities that partnered with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, undocumented residents

were anxious about contacting local police. One immigrant interviewed for the study had witnessed an attempted carjacking in a dimly lit parking lot. Although he disrupted the crime by shouting, he fled the scene when the victim called police, fearful that giving a statement would put him in jeopardy of deportation.

Another rationale for Trump's attack on sanctuary cities is that their existence stimulates more undocumented immigration, but there is no evidence of such a magnet effect. Undocumented migrants, like the vast majority of immigrants in general, are drawn to the United States by economic opportunity and family ties to relatives who are already here. Some are fleeing gang and drug violence. None of these key drivers of migration would be weakened by the abolition of sanctuary cities.

Trump's rhetoric also presumes a strong link between undocumented immigrants and crime, but research consistently shows that immigrants are less likely than native-born citizens to commit crimes, including violent ones. Reducing crime requires setting priorities and making smart choices. Sanctuary jurisdictions get it right, by prioritizing police-community trust-building.

In the absence of comprehensive immigration reform that provides a path to legalization for most of today's undocumented population, sanctuary jurisdictions are an important tool for maintaining public safety. Punishing them fiscally and bullying their mayors and county executives into abandoning immigrant protections will only sow fear among undocumented and mixed-status families, making them more reluctant to invest in homes, businesses, and education. Meanwhile, very few are likely to "self-deport." Two-thirds have been living in the

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United States for over 10 years and retain no economic base in their countries of origin.

We need immigration reform, but sanctuary cities are not the problem. Making undocumented immigrants feel more vulnerable serves no useful public purpose, however politically expedient it may be for President Trump.

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*UC Press). Monica W. Varsanyi is Associate Professor of Political Science at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice and a co-author of *Policing Immigrants: Local Law Enforcement on the Front Lines* (University of Chicago Press, 2016). Portions of this article were published in *The Los Angeles Times*, February 2, 2017.*

## What the Trump Presidency Means for the Global Climate Fight

By David Victor

*Professor of International Relations, School of Global Policy and Strategy*

With **Donald Trump** in the White House, what's in store for U.S. climate and energy policies? Answering that question is hard since Trump has never run a public institution and thus has no track record. His most cited comment about global warming — that it was a Chinese hoax invented to destroy American jobs — came in November 2012 from a 19-word tweet, hardly the medium for reasoned policy analysis.

One thing is clear: The Trump administration has the potential to inflict more harm on global cooperation around climate than any prior president. After the successful Paris agreement last year, that cooperation was finally poised to make progress with decisive U.S. leadership. I doubt that the Trump presidency will kill the Paris process — too many other countries are too invested in its success. But it will shift the intellectual and political leadership of the process from the United States to other countries, most notably China.

Domestic policy is much harder to parse. Don't expect any climate change initiatives by a Trump administration, which means that efforts started under Obama to understand and prepare for the impacts of climate change will be put on hold — to the country's detriment. But on emissions, national policy is almost synonymous with energy

policy, since most warming emissions come from the energy sector. The Trump administration has begun a big rollback of regulation — in particular, rules that have a disproportionate impact on small business. But most of what really matters in current federal administrative law on energy and the environment requires notification and review and is not easily reversed.

The acid test for regulatory rollback will be the recently completed Clean Power Plan. The president, no matter how hostile his administration might be to such actions, can't easily nullify them, though the courts might do that job for him. Fully unraveling the plan's effects will take many years and may be impossible to completely achieve because many compliance efforts are already underway in industry. There are also other state and federal policies that reinforce the plan—indeed, some states will probably do a lot more on climate change precisely because the federal government is widely seen as hostile to climate policy. Four years of Trump will have very little impact on national energy investment patterns and policy that are already largely grounded. That's because the energy sector is slow to change, most policies are enshrined in law and difficult to unseat, and the very thought of a Trump administration overseeing national energy policy will inevitably shift more of the action to the

states. Trump will soon making America smoggy again.

For people who want to see America engaged in serious global cooperation and a continued decarbonization of the U.S. energy system, the likely chaos of the Trump administration will require new political strategies. Two former GOP leaders, **James A. Baker** and **George Shultz**, have proposed a carbon tax, the proceeds of which would be rebated to taxpayers, but so far their proposal has not gained much political traction. Activists and politicians who care about climate issues need to focus on how to offset the harmful effects of Trump on global diplomacy — something that is possible, to some degree. And they need to gear up for policy action in the states (and defenses of existing policies through the courts).

The most immediate effect of Trump's rise will be in how the United States works with other countries. Climate change is a global problem: The U.S. accounts for only 16 percent of total annual emissions and thus the only way to affect the global picture is through leadership and cooperation. Paris worked where other efforts, such as the Kyoto Protocol, largely failed because it adopted a more flexible, "bottom up" approach to governance that the U.S. had been advocating for years. This flexible ap-

proach made it possible to get more countries engaged and set the stage for a truly global effort to cut emissions.

Literally overnight, the U.S. role in this process has changed. Foreign nations may have overreacted to Trump's tweet about a Chinese hoax in global warming, but clearly the Trump team is hostile to climate policy, a point confirmed by the choice of **Scott Pruitt** to head the Environmental Protection Agency. As Attorney General of Oklahoma he sued to overthrow the Clean Power Act. In his new office he has opined that human activity is "not a primary contributor to global warming." Trump has stated he will "cancel" the Paris agreement, which is not something he himself can actually do. A Trump administration could withdraw from Paris or even from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (the parent of the Paris agreement), both processes that can unfold fairly quickly (1-3 years). But unlike earlier administrations — such as **George W Bush**'s, which abandoned the Kyoto Protocol before the U.S. tried to ratify the agreement, or **George H.W. Bush**'s, which never submitted the Convention on Biological Diversity for U.S. ratification — the Trump administration will soon find that it is very difficult and diplomatically costly to abandon existing treaty commitments. This is unlikely to be a high priority for a newly elected president who devoted virtually zero attention to climate policy during the campaign.

The most harmful impacts of the Trump presidency on climate cooperation will come in two other ways. First is funding. In Paris, nations reconfirmed a pledge to provide \$100 billion in new money to help developing countries engage with climate policy, with a large fraction earmarked for the least developed countries that are the most exposed to the harms of unchecked warming. Nobody really knows what counts as new money, but as a sign of good faith, the developed nations put up \$10 billion to get started — one-third from the U.S., and one-third from China. America has not

yet paid all of its commitment, and it seems clear that Trump will not. For the developing countries, this will be a sign that America is unreliable and that the benefits of staying engaged in climate negotiations are fleeting. While these countries are generally not large greenhouse gas emitters, having their support is essential to making formal decisions — including adoption of the Paris agreement.

The other big harm that Trump will cause almost immediately to the Paris process will come when the U.S. no longer leads in the long, difficult process of putting the accord into effect. The Paris agreement is what's known as "pledge and review." Countries make pledges to cut emissions and adopt various policies, and then every few years those efforts are reviewed. Success hinges on review, and until Tuesday it was assumed that the U.S. would help show the world how good review systems actually work. Indeed, the U.S., along with China, had already done that in volunteering itself for peer review of its fossil fuel subsidy reform policies. Without leadership, the review process will probably follow narrow and bureaucratic U.N. rules, which are the only rules countries can agree upon right now, so formal review will be impotent.

The ability to get countries to cut emissions will suffer as the fragile coalition that created Paris splinters and as the process loses its biggest champion for turning the promise of the Paris agreement into a functioning diplomatic machinery. My guess is that this won't kill the Paris process, but it will severely weaken it.

The most interesting impact of all this may be on China. For the last few years, the U.S. and China played a central role in building the Paris regime through their "G2" bilateral efforts on energy innovation and joint announcements of emission cutting goals and policies. That approach of country-tailored com-

mitments is enshrined in the pledge and review process that helped make Paris a success. The Chinese have favored this approach for its flexibility, and while the G2 relationship may quickly die (or go into hibernation) under Trump, China's commitment to this approach won't. If the U.S. leaves Paris and eliminates its leadership role, that leaves China to steer the ship.

The Paris climate conference set the ambitious goal of finding ways to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, rather than the previous threshold of 2 degrees. What is the difference? And how realistic is such a target? Uncertainties abound over what a future Trump administration may look like on energy and climate policy. Yet as the shock of his victory wears off, it will be essential to look realistically at what he can and can't do.

In foreign policy, he has huge leverage, and he could cause a lot of harm to the progress already made. Friends of climate change diplomacy should gear up to help explain to the world that not all of the Trumpian bluster will be followed by reality. Senior diplomats out of power — along with leaders of NGOs and of firms that have a stake in effective global strategies — should help reassure the world that America has not abandoned its climate commitments forever. It is also crucial to look for places where the gaps created as Trump abandons or weakens climate change diplomacy might be filled in — on the review process, for example, academics and NGOs have already built much of the capacity that will be needed to demonstrate effective review. They should seek allies in those governments that remain committed to Paris — whether in Europe or India or China — to keep the diplomatic ship afloat even as its traditional captain leaves the scene for now.

# Trump on Trade

**By Lawrence Krause**

*Professor Emeritus of Economics,  
School of Global Policy and Strategy*

Although he shows little regard for professional economists, President **Trump** has made economic policy a major focus of his agenda – with respect to taxes, regulation, and especially international trade. His “America First” approach would reverse policies followed since 1934 that culminated after World War II in an effort to create a liberal world economic order designed, negotiated, and implemented by this country. The many trade agreements we have entered into (such as the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods, GATT, the Uruguay and Doha rounds, the World Trade Organization, etc.) have encouraged international cooperation, promoted economic growth, and greatly enhanced national security. What is now called “globalization” was made possible by our initiative and insistence. After all this, Trump is now calling on us to return to the days when we would make bi-lateral deals only if they were one-sidedly beneficial to us.

During the presidential campaign, candidate Trump promised to withdraw from the completed, but not yet approved Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP); to re-negotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which he claimed was too favorable to Mexico; to charge China with being a

currency manipulator and impose a 45% tariff on goods imported from China; and take other unspecified measures to correct the U.S. trade imbalance (excess of imports over exports). He repeatedly disparaged our negotiators as incompetents who made “disastrous” bad trade deals. He implicitly thinks of trade as a zero-sum game by which you either win or lose. The supposed beneficiaries of these trade-restricting measures would be the workers (mainly men, mainly white) who lost their jobs to import competition – not, as they actually did, mainly to automation.

While economists overwhelmingly believe that free trade improves the welfare of the country as a whole, they also recognize that there are losers in society when trade is liberalized. Some have advocated government-provided trade adjustment assistance (TAS) to compensate the losers, and such measures have sometimes been included in legislation authorizing trade negotiations. However, TAS has rarely been well funded or imaginatively administrated, and it rests on weak moral grounds. Why should workers or communities be compensated for trade-related losses when similar help is not provided for similarly impacted victims of technological change or other eco-

nomie dislocations? The economic losers from globalization were among the most responsive to Trump’s promise to “make America Great Again” by restoring domestic manufacturing.

President Trump ended US participation in TPP by executive order on his first day in office. The remainder of his protectionist agenda faces significant difficulties and may well be modified or not implemented. Trade restricting measures have significant negative consequences along with the promised gains. For example, the U.S. and Mexican economies have become remarkably integrated through NAFTA. This is easily seen in places like San Diego and Tijuana. Disturbing this trade will negatively impact both sides of the border and engender political opposition. Even restrictive measures on trade with China, which many analysts believe improperly got the lion’s share of the gains through trade with the U.S., may not be such a great idea. The threat to U.S. security from North Korea will require China’s cooperation. As this example shows, trade has far-reaching spillover effects. The United States still needs friends abroad, and friends don’t destabilize each other’s economies.

## Emeriti Association Book Club

Monday,  
April 24th

*Spy Fiction Genre*




The UCSD Emeriti Association’s Book Club meets from 11:30 AM to 1 PM, on the fourth Monday of each month at the Ida & Cecil Green Faculty Club.

Please RSVP on the EA RSVP website:

<https://hrweb.ucsd.edu/ea/>

Monday,  
May 22nd





# Anecdotalage


By *Sandy Lakoff*

## Yet More Puns!

(Thanks to *Susan Goulian*)

When fish are in schools, they sometimes take debate.

A thief who stole a calendar got twelve months.



When the smog lifts in Los Angeles U.C.L.A.

The batteries were given out free of charge.

A dentist and a manicurist married. They fought tooth and nail.

Police were summoned to a daycare center where a three-year-old was resisting a rest.

Did you hear about the fellow whose entire left side was cut off? He's all right now.



When a clock is hungry it goes back four seconds.

I tried to catch some fog, but I mist.

When she saw her first strands of grey hair she thought she'd dye.

(Thanks to *Phee Sharline*)

Venison for dinner again? Oh deer!

How does **Moses** make tea? Hebrews it.

England has no kidney bank, but it does have a Liverpool.

They told me I had type-A blood, but it was a typo.

I changed my iPod's name to Titanic. It's syncing now.

Jokes about German sausage are the wurst.

I know a guy who's addicted to brake fluid, but he says he can stop any time.

I stayed up all night to see where the sun went, and then it dawned on me.

This girl said she recognized me from the vegetarian club, but I'd never met herbivore.

When chemists die, they barium.


I'm reading a book about anti-gravity. I just can't put it down.

I did a theatrical performance about puns. It was a play on words.

Why were the Indians here first? They had reservations.

What do you call a dinosaur with an extensive vocabulary?

## A thesaurus.



I didn't like my beard at first. Then it grew on me.

Did you hear about the cross-eyed teacher who lost her job because she couldn't control her pupils?

When you get a bladder infection, urine trouble.

Broken pencils are pointless.

I dropped out of communism class because of lousy Marx.

I got a job at a bakery because I kneaded dough.

*[Humanity] has unquestionably one really effective weapon—laughter. Power, money, persuasion, supplication, persecution—these can lift at a colossal humbug—push it a little—weaken it a little, century by century, but only laughter can blow it to rags and atoms at a blast. Against the assault of laughter nothing can stand. —*

*Mark Twain*

## Proposed Slate for 2017 - 2018

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<b>Phyllis Mirsky</b>	<b>Vice President</b>
<b>Robert Knox</b>	<b>Secretary/Treasurer</b>
<b>Mark Appelbaum</b>	<b>Past President</b>

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**Members at Large:** Stan Chodorow (History, Campus); Win Cox (Communications, Campus); Fran Gillin (Health Sciences); Henry Powell (Health Sciences); Marguerite Jackson, (Health Sciences) and Gill Williamson (Mathematics, Campus).

**Ex Officio:** Dick Attiyeh, Representative to CUCEA; Jack Fisher, Historian; Liaison to the UCSD Retirement Association; Sandy Lakoff, Editor, Chronicles, Suzan Cioffi, Managing Editor, Chronicles, and Director, UCSD Retirement Resource Center; and Maxine Bloor, Liaison to Oceanids.

The election of the proposed slate will take place in April by email. If you do not have access to email, you are welcome to mail in your approval of the proposed slate, or your proposal of an alternate officer or Member at large to: Suzan Cioffi, Director, UCSD Retirement Resource Center, UCSD, 9500 Gilman Drive, #0020, La Jolla, CA 92093-0020. The deadline for mail ballots is April 25, 2017.

## Chronicles

Newsletter of the UCSD Emeriti Association

◆◆◆

<b>Sanford Lakoff</b>	<b>Editor</b>
<b>Suzan Cioffi</b>	<b>Managing Editor</b>

### Officers

<b>Mark Appelbaum</b>	<b>President</b>
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<b>Robert Knox</b>	<b>Secretary/Treasurer</b>
<b>Henry Powell</b>	<b>Past President, Awards</b>

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*Forward queries, changes in mailing/email address to:*  
Suzan Cioffi, Director, UCSD Retirement Resource Center,  
UCSD, 9500 Gilman Drive, #0020, La Jolla, CA 92093-0020.  
Telephone: (858) 534-4724, Emeriti@ucsd.edu

**BOTH of the following events are on WEDNESDAY, MAY 10**

**Chancellor's Scholars  
Freshman Cohort  
Academic Poster Session—  
Free of charge / open to all  
Seuss Library, UCSD Faculty Club,  
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM**



**Annual Business Luncheon  
Atkinson Pavilion, UCSD Faculty Club  
11:30 AM - 2:00 PM  
Fee: \$25 member/\$40 non-members  
Margaret Leinen, Ph.D.  
Vice Chancellor for Marine Sciences, Director of  
Scripps Institution of Oceanography, and Dean of  
the School of Marine Sciences  
Topic: "Our Changing Oceans & Their Impact"  
Mail your check to the UCSD Emeriti Association  
9500 Gilman Drive, MC 0020, La Jolla, CA 92093-0020**